THE

1995 Norwegian Rocket Incident

A nuclear crisis simulation

2023 Version: **Head of State Russia**

OSLO NUCLEAR PROJECT

UNIVERSITY OF OSLO

Acknowledgements

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This simulation is based on archival sources from the Norwegian Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Foreign Affairs collected by Dr. Målfrid Braut-Hegghammer in 2018. Source materials can be made available on request.

Interview with former CIA Agent about the incident

How did a research rocket that intended to collect information on the Northern Lights almost cause an international nuclear incident? Use the following QR code to learn more about how the 1995 rocket incident in Northern Norway unfolded by hearing from the people that were there and those who were closely followed the incident from abroad."

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Introduction

This is a handbook for participants in a nuclear incident simulation between Norway and Russia. First, we review important background information about the key actors and their technical and diplomatic resources to resolve an international incident. Second, we provide information regarding roles, assignments, negotiations issues, and learning objectives.

The goal of this simulation is to provide an understanding of trade-off negotiation dynamics between states, information problems during times of crisis, the risks of unintended nuclear escalation, and the importance of nuclear risk reduction.

Each section of the simulation will deal with these themes, where the first stage will emphasize the role of information, and the second and third stages will emphasize risk reduction and alliance management and negotiation mechanisms.

Prologue

Since its establishment in 1962, Andøya Space Center (previously named Andøya Rocket Range) in Northern Norway has regularly launched rockets for research purposes. On the 25th of January 1995, a Black Brant XII rocket was launched to investigate the climatic conditions producing northern lights. Norway followed the standard notification protocol beforehand: neighboring countries were warned on the 21st of December 1994 that the rocket would be launched between the 15th of January and the 10th of February, with the exact date depending on weather conditions. In Russia, the note was dropped somewhere along the communication line, allegedly within its Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Russia was therefore alerted when their Early Warning Systems detected the rocket and identified it as a possible nuclear missile. The Black Brant rocket was in the air for 23 minutes. Sources have it that for eight of these minutes, Russia was on high alert and Russian President Boris Yeltsin was contemplating whether or not to respond with a retaliatory nuclear strike against the United States.

1.0 Objectives

The simulation will produce one policy memo, negotiations, and risk reduction measures.

STAGE 1

In Stage 1, delegations react to reports of a Norwegian rocket incident. Each actor (Russia, Norway, and other NATO delegations) will draft a policy memo, providing their Heads of State (HoS) with background information, policy options, and a proposed final decision. This document will be for the delegation's eyes only and should include reasoning for why the final decision was selected and what alternatives were considered. These documents will be working documents for the delegation, and will form the basis for their statements and actions, but will not be circulated to all participants.

STAGE 2

In Stage 2, delegations seek to address the rocket incident through bilateral negotiations. During this stage of the simulation, negotiations should reflect the objectives of the policy memo drafted in Stage 1. The policy memo can be edited and adjusted based on negotiated outcomes.

STAGE 3

In Stage 3, delegations pursue risk reduction measures. Norway and Russia will agree on bilateral risk reduction measures, and will present these measures in multilateral fora. The Norwegian delegation will produce a public statement at the NATO multilateral meeting. Not all actors are required to produce public statements leading up to the NATO multilateral meeting. However, if other delegations wish to provide a public statement describing their reaction to the nuclear incident, negotiations, and their delegations' recommendations, they may do so. Distribution of public statements may occur through online platforms (e.g., Slack), or, upon approval from the NATO Secretary General, at the multilateral meeting.

Learn more about nuclear escalation and risk reduction

Nuclear escalation has been a concern since nuclear weapons were first developed. Scan the QR code to learn more about how nuclear escalation occurred on the day of the Norwegian Rocket Incident. The QR code to also demonstrates the continued importance of nuclear risk reduction in Incidents such as Norwegian Rocket Incident.

2.0 Background Information: NATO, Norway, and Russia

The following review provides important background information about the key actors in the simulation, which involved Norway, Russia and NATO in late January 1995.

2.1 NATO in 1995

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is a military alliance founded in 1949. Article 5 of the Washington Treaty establishes the alliance's collective defense principle, where an armed attack against one member state is considered an attack against all. By 1995, the alliance had 16 member states (Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, the United Kingdom and the United States). 1995 was in the middle of initial debates about NATO's eastward enlargement and partnership with Russia.

With the end of the Cold War and collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union, NATO needed to repurpose and restructure itself. This led to a reduction in their standing forces, increased focus on flexibility and mobility, and eventually engagement in so-called "out of area" military operations. At the same time, uneasiness among Allies was growing over Russia's siege of Grozny, as well as its support for the Bosnian Serbs. There were also growing concerns about Russia's compliance with the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty.

NATO's Headquarters is in Brussels. The North Atlantic Council (NAC) is the organization's principal decision-making body, consisting of Permanent Representatives from each member state. The Secretary General and his staff chair the meetings of the NAC. All NATO decisions are made by consensus, after discussions and consultations among members.

NATO military exercises: Several NATO exercises were held in and near Norwegian territory in the 1980s and 1990s such as TEAMWORK, STRONG RESOLVE and ADVENTURE EXPRESS, some of which proved to be of great concern to the Russians.

2.2 The Andøya Rocket Range

The Andøya Rocket Range is a civilian rocket testing range in northern Norway focusing on scientific exploration of the Arctic ionosphere and middle atmosphere. The first scientific rocket was launched in 1962, and since then Andøya has regularly been used for scientific rocket launches.

The rocket launched on 25 January 1995, (Black Brant XII), was much larger than what had previously been launched from Andøya; consisting of four stages and measuring 17 meters. It

was equipped with the first stage of an old American tactical missile (the Talos surface-to-air nuclear-capable missile), giving it a boost phase speed higher than previous launches.

Notification routines: In 1995, the standard notification routines for rockets launched from Andøya was: (1) the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs was obliged to inform all concerned counties weeks in advance via diplomatic channels about the time of the rocket campaign.[1] (2) The Norwegian Civil Aviation Administration, "Luftfartsverket," was obliged under International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) rules to send a "notice to air mission" (NOTAM) to the civil airspace authorities in surrounding countries prior to the launch.[2]

2.3 Norway-Russia relations in 1995

With a shared border in the north, the relationship with Russia is of great strategic importance for Norway.

The Norway-Russia relationship is asymmetrical with respect to military power. Norway's membership in NATO and bilateral relationship with the United States redresses this imbalance. For Russia, Norway is a small state with limited military capabilities on the one hand, and a member of a strong military alliance on the other.

During and after the Cold War, Norway has sought a relationship with Russia characterized by both deterrence and reassurance with regard to military activities. This relationship seeks to reduce the negative consequences of the threat Russia perceives from Norway as a NATO member.

By 1995, tensions from the Cold War were declining and the bilateral relationship between the two neighbors could generally be characterized as cooperative and friendly. However outstanding issues on border demarcation, resource rights, and other issues remained unsolved until 2010. In addition, Norway continued to host large-scale NATO exercises with more than 10,000 troops throughout this period.

2.4 Russian Federation in 1995

Armed forces: After the collapse of the Soviet Union the Soviet Armed Forces separated across the former Soviet Republics. Russia inherited a large but hollow military organization with aging equipment and massive manpower. With little to no money for sustaining this force, the Russian armed forces were

severely diminished in the 1990s. Consequently, Russian military standing and capabilities were called into question. This culminated in the humiliating Russian failures in the First Chechen War. Additionally, Russia was in violation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) due to its military activity in Chechnya, and its forces had not fully withdrawn from the Baltics, Georgia, or Moldova, contributing to the unraveling of the CFE Treaty.

First Chechen War: Russia's war in Chechnya from December 1994 to August 1996 was unpopular among the Russian population and was perceived as a military embracement for

1 In this incident, the notification was sent 21 December, indicating a launch window of 15 January to 10 February 1995.

2 In this incident, the NOTAM was sent on 16 January.

the Russian Federation. In the weeks prior to the Andøya incident, the Russians had conducted an intense military campaign against the Chechen capital Grozny. The initial campaign ended in a humiliating Russian defeat. Russia eventually seized the presidential palace in Grozny on 19 January 1995, but at a huge cost and with a high number of casualties. Thus, the backdrop for the Andøya incident was a situation where Russia's status as a great power (militarily and economically) was under intense pressure.

Nuclear arsenal: Despite reductions in the number of nuclear warheads since the mid-80s, the Russian nuclear stockpile was still over 18,000 warheads in 1995.[3] Although the Russian nuclear forces were prioritized in terms of resources and financing compared to conventional forces, the diminishing resource situation and the loss of early warning assets that had been located in the former Soviet republics meant that Russia's nuclear forces were a diminished force compared to their Soviet predecessor. Concerns over the security of Russia's nuclear arsenal grew to alarming levels throughout this period. The U.S. Nunn-Lugar program spent more than $1 billion by January 1995 with the intention of helping repatriate Russian nuclear weapons to Russian territory and to secure and account for them to prevent nuclear theft.

Nuclear doctrine: The Russian military doctrine of 1993 emphasized that the Russian aim in the nuclear sphere was to eliminate the danger of nuclear war by deterring aggression against the Russian Federation and its allies. It further stated that Russia would not employ nuclear weapons against a state party to the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), which does not possess nuclear weapons. Exceptions to this include: 1) an armed attack against the Russian Federation's territory or Armed Forces by states allied with a nuclear weapon state 2) joint actions, where an allied non-nuclear weapon state supports a nuclear weapon state in the carrying out an armed attack upon the Russian Federation's territory or Armed Forces. Russian military writing at the time emphasized the need for Russia to rely on nuclear weapons for territorial defense, especially because the early results of the First Chechen War starkly illustrated the limited capabilities of Russia's conventional forces.

Early-warning system: An early warning system detects incoming missiles before it reaches their targets. Ideally, it can detect the scale of an incoming attack, its origin, and estimate potential damage. An early warning system is necessary for implementing a launch-on-warning posture, which implies the initiation of a retaliatory nuclear strike upon the warning of an incoming attack, before the attacking missiles reach their targets. The Russian early-warning system is on continuous alert: the detection of a missile of a certain size and speed, within certain trajectories would place the system on high alert automatically. This alert would cue personnel to urgently check for other signs of a "bolt from the blue" strike. Information about the launch would be transmitted via the early-warning system to the highest level of command in the Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF) and to the General Staff. Upon receiving such information, the General on-duty would activate the Kazbek system, which in turn activates the nuclear suitcases carried by the President, Minister of Defense, and Chief of the General Staff. There is no automaticity in the system for launching a nuclear response: the Russian President must issue the order to launch, and his order must be confirmed by the Minister of Defense or Chief of the General Staff (although concurrence is not strictly necessary). Russia also retained a Soviet automatic nuclear weapons-control system known as Perimeter, which, if switched on, could automatically order the launch of Russia's nuclear arsenal following an enemy first strike, even after Russia's political leadership had been decapitated or was otherwise unable to order a retaliatory strike.

- The two main components of the Russian Early-Warning System were ground-based early-warning radars that could detect an incoming missile once it reached the detection zone of the radar, and space-based early-warning sensors (including satellites on highly elliptical and geosynchronous orbits) that could detect entire trajectories, depending on capabilities and coverage.

- In 1995, there were significant gaps in the Russian Early Warning system, in particular in its satellite-based warning capability. Russia was aware of a blind spot in its early warning system in the high north, which created a narrow corridor through which a first strike could pass undetected. At the time of the Andøya incident, two of Russia's satellites were capable of detecting the launch.

- The rocket from Andøya could have also been

3 Kristensen, H. M., & Norris, R. S. (2013). Global nuclear weapons inventories, 1945–2013. *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 69*(5), 75-81.

detected by Russian ground-based early warning radars located at Olenogorsk-1 in Murmansk. These would be continuously monitoring for any kind of incoming missile, including for missiles whose trajectories indicated they were initial "blinding attacks" directed at the radars, leaving Russia unable to detect other incoming missiles. Russian planners anticipated that such a "blinding strike" could be the first initiation of a larger and massive incoming attack of intercontinental ballistic missiles from the United States.

Launch Notifications: In 1988, the Soviet Union signed an agreement with the United States to notify one another of strategic ballistic missile launches. Designed as a confidence building measure, this treaty mandates that both Russia and the United States have transparent launch notification procedures for intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine launched ballistic missiles.

2.5 NATO-Russia relations in 1995

With the end of the Cold War, relations between the former adversaries improved, and NATO and Russia initiated talks on several levels.

Formal contact and cooperation between NATO and Russia began in 1991, under the framework of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC); this was a forum for dialogue and cooperation between NATO and former Soviet states. In 1997, the NACC was succeeded by the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council.

In 1994, Russia joined the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program. This format facilitated bilateral cooperation between NATO and individual Euro-Atlantic countries, including all the former Soviet states and states that were set to join NATO. However, Russia had a special Individual Partnership Program, which included a platform for "Enhanced NATO-Russia Dialogue and Cooperation." This was superseded by the NATO-Russia Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security of 1997.

Throughout this period, NATO and Russia began discussing NATO enlargement. Discussions included the September

1995 Study on Enlargement, which had been consulted heavily with Russia. The first round of enlargement occurred in 1999, with the first three former Warsaw Pact countries to join: Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary. From a relatively early stage, Russia expressed discontent with being treated on a similar level to all the other former Soviet and Warsaw Pact states in NATO.

There were sharp disputes with Russia at NATO Headquarters over the war in Yugoslavia, the First Chechen War, and Russia's spotty record on CFE implementation throughout this period. Allies used the NACC to press Russia to implement the CFE after the breakup of the Soviet Union and continued bilateral efforts to ensure Russian forces left all occupied territory. In 1996, NATO Allies agreed to amend the CFE Treaty to allow for Russia's non-compliance with its flank limits in the Chechen wars. At the same time, Russia sought to limit NATO forces and infrastructure on the territory of the new members throughout this period, culminating in special provisions in the Istanbul Summit of 1999.

2.6 Technical talks

In February 1995, following the Norwegian rocket incident the deputy director of the Andøya Launch Center held meetings with various Norwegian government, technical, and political representatives. These talks emphasized that while contact with Russian authorities had been made on improving future notification routines, it would take time before the Russians would give the Norwegians feedback on their proposals. The Norwegian Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Intelligence prepared an analysis of the incident.

Norwegian officials agreed that notification procedures needed improvement. Subsequently, they planned a notification procedure for any accidents, where a telecommunication connection would be established from Andøya Rocket Range directly to the military command system in Russia. This proposal was of much discussion in Norwegian-Russian talks following the incident.

- Because of the time it would take for Russia to engage with Norway, Norway unilaterally instituted a new procedure of launch notifications wherein Andøya notifies the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' Secretary Guard, which then informs the Coordination Section, the Political Department, and the embassy in Moscow.

- Despite the unilateral nature of this adjustment, the Russian embassy was informed of the new notification procedure while the request for bilateral talks was pending.

In March, Norway received notice that Russian authorities welcomed Norway's unilateral initiative to adjust the notification routine, stating they would like to be notified of all launches with as much detail as possible, and considered Norway's initiative to be a first step towards an international agreement on notification of ballistic missile launches.

The U.S. European Command monitored the events at Andøya, noting that at the time of the launch, the notification had not been passed on to Russian radar technicians. Following the incident, notification and disclosure protocols were re-evaluated and redesigned both in Russia and the US.

2.7 Nuclear risk reduction center

Prior to the incident, in 1988, the United States Department of State began operating the Nuclear Risk Reduction Center. This center was an agreement between the U.S. and Soviet Union and was intended to create an additional channel of communication for the prevention of nuclear war, including a hotline and diplomatic channels.

On 26 January 1995, during the incident, Russian President Boris Yeltsin stated he used the "hot line" to his defense ministry to chart the progress of the rocket launched from Andøya. He stated, "I indeed yesterday used for the first time my 'black' suitcase with the button which is always carried with me. I linked up instantly with the ministry of defense, with all those military leaders-generals whom I need and we tracked the path of this rocket from beginning to end." [4]

In March, following the incident, Russian authorities told Norway they would like to discuss in more detail establishing a direct emergency channel between the two countries.

Generally, the goal of nuclear risk reduction centers are to engage technical and policy experts, and reduce nuclear risk by promoting collaboration on nuclear-related issues. In the Andøya incident, changes in launch notification procedures in Norway, Russia, and the United States all constitute risk reduction efforts.

4 Reuters, "Yeltsin Says He Used Defence Hot Line Over Missile," 26 January 1995.

3.0 Simulation Logistics

3.1 Simulation Preparation and Suggestions for Heads of States

Below are some recommendations for participants to ensure their successful participation in this simulation.

During the simulation:

- Please ensure that all members of your delegation sign the attendance sheet day of and attend the required pre-meeting briefings so they have a prior understanding of the simulation
- Please ensure that participants remain in character (and dressed appropriately, suits are recommended, heavy emphasis on no hoodies or jeans)
- Please ensure that the participants address you as the head of State (and reprimand anyone who fails to do so)
- Please ensure that you consult with your key decision-making guidance points during the simulation, and do not share these ahead of time with the participants (treat your Book as a highly classified document)
- Instruct participants to consult with you in person or via online platforms for any key decisions, statements, bilateral negotiations and reactions to new developments in a crisis.
- Ensure that your delegation follows your orders, protects your national interests and does not escalate the situation due to misperception, technical error or misjudging the opponent's behavior.
- Ensure a coherent set of messages from your delegation (unless you seek to send mixed signals)

Communications:

- Via designated online platforms (you will receive information about the online accounts separately, in the pre-meetings phase)
- In a formal meeting during the simulation itself you will begin by briefing your participants and communicating your objectives
- Please ensure you are available online and respond promptly if you are not meeting with your delegation.

3.2 Head of State Russian Guidance

President Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin,

Your key challenges during this simulation are to a) escalate the crisis as much as possible without sparking a NATO-Russia clash, and b) seek to use the feeling of crisis as psychological leverage to gain new crisis-management and political consultation mechanisms with both Norway and NATO.

You are on your own and in a militarily and economically weakened position vs. NATO after the disintegration of the Soviet Union. You are also facing both a political crisis and economic collapse at home. However, you still have 18,000 nuclear warheads at your disposal – arguably the final symbol of your superpower status. You must use the limited tools you have available to ensure that the West listens to your concerns and gain some concessions from Norway and NATO. At the same time, a military clash with NATO could lead to nuclear escalation, so you have to put pressure on Norway and the Alliance without pushing the situation over the brink.

Pre-simulation meeting:

You should use this meeting to help the participants:

1. Get into character (ask them to introduce themselves and explain their position, introduce your character and explain who you are).
2. Understand Russia's general situation (diplomatically and militarily weak, facing internal economic and political crisis, but still one of the world's two largest nuclear powers).
1. Define Russia's broad preferences for the simulation: put pressure on Norway and NATO without sparking a military clash; gain maximum concessions from Norway and NATO on technical risk-reduction measures (Norway) and a forum for diplomatic consultations on European security (NATO).

Simulation:

During Stage 1, a key objective is to establish what happened at Andøya and the status of Russian detection capabilities,

react aggressively to the detection of the rocket, and deny Russia's responsibility for the crisis. This will require asking your delegation to find out what happened at Andøya (we will issue information during the crisis simulation to answer this question, but also have a look at the background description of Andøya for further details). Having established the facts, and what the Norwegian and NATO signals are, your delegation will prepare a policy memo document laying out Russia's interests and objectives for the subsequent sessions. As Head of State, you want to defuse the crisis, but in a way that will secure the maximum gains for Moscow. You have final approval of any decision document at the end of Stage 1.

Discuss with your team: What happened with the rocket, was it an attack – do we know? How should Russia respond to minimize its blame and maximize its gains? Should Russia put its nuclear forces on alert? What should Russia demand from Norway and NATO?

At the beginning of Stage 2 you will also deliver a pre-prepared statement to the press corps. (This will be provided by the event organizers.)

During Stage 2, a key objective is to adapt your actions considering new information coming to light. This will include preparing your position for a bilateral meeting with Norway on the unfolding incident. Your position at this meeting may not fully reflect the policy memo document: remember, you want to look as strong as possible and deflect any blame for the crisis. Here, your delegation will support you in preparing policy options and recommendations. You should decide the line to take with the Norwegians before the meeting starts, but your delegation will take the lead in the meeting itself.

Key objectives for the Russia-Norway meeting will include a) to deflect any blame from Russia, b) put pressure on Norway to agree to a technical crisis reduction dialogue, c) tell Oslo that they must press for a NATO-Russia consultation on the European security order.

Discuss with your team: Which parts of the policy memo document should we emphasize in the meeting with Norway and which should we hide? What should we demand from Norway? Should Russia try to escalate the situation to gain concessions from Norway and NATO or could this backfire?

During Stage 3, a key objective is to highlight how committed Russia is to risk reduction and their willingness to pursue further measures with other NATO delegations (i.e., U.S.). At the same time, Russia will keep the pressure on NATO consultations and try to shape the outcome of the discussion, even though you are not there. This will require continued use of Slack and the press to send threats and demands, while gathering information via your intelligence service regarding the course of the negotiations. Your ideal outcome would be the establishment of a NATO-Russia political consultation mechanism, alongside the Norway-Russia technical agreement to minimize the risk of another crisis in the future.

Discuss with your team: How can Russia make its presence felt in the NATO meeting without being present? Is your strategy working, or would easing your aggressive stance result in a better result? How far should Russia continue an aggressive tone, or would that be counterproductive?

3.3 Participant preparation

Participants are required to be present, perform their assigned role, and prepare documents as described below. Below are some recommendations for participants to ensure their successful participation in this simulation.

During the simulation

- Participants should dress appropriately for the simulation: suits or similar (no hoodies or jeans).
- Participants must read the assigned readings for this session as well as the background readings in this handbook. They must also attend the pre-meeting background session.
- Participants are expected to play their part in the simulation as realistically as possible, behaviors and statements must resemble what participants in an actual incident would say or do (including using proper titles for heads of states and the senior military leadership, standing up when the Head of State enters the room, and expecting to be demoted or worse if they act contrary to the instructions of their Head of State). Coordination problems, misperception and time pressure will be central challenges for all delegations and participants. Participants from different delegations cannot engage in "free-lance" diplomacy or discuss with members from other delegations without the approval or knowledge of the other members of their own delegation.
- Participants may bring laptops and are welcome to search for additional information as part of their role.
- Participants will not post any information or related materials online or on any social media during or after the simulation. The simulation cannot be recorded or photographed at any stage without explicit permission from the organizers.

Communication takes place

- Via designated online platforms such as Slack (including communication with your Head of State).
- Formal or informal meetings within or between delegations (where each side will take notes to ensure the other side does not misrepresent what has been said and decided).

3.4 Delegation sizes and roles

There will be three main actors in this simulation: Russia, Norway, and other NATO delegations.

Norway and Russia will each have a Head of State with an associated staff, including representatives from their foreign ministry, military, and the intelligence agencies. Each participant in the simulation will have an assigned title in their delegation. Roles are described, in general terms, below. Beyond these general guidelines, the tasks of the teams are defined by the Head of State (or the Secretary General, in the case of the NATO delegation). It is not possible to refuse to carry out tasks or ignore orders given by the Head of State (or Secretary General) – this will lead to exile and loss of pension (in extreme cases, even prison).

The NATO delegations will consist of a Secretariat as well as delegations from the following countries: Norway, the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Germany.

Additionally, there will be press teams, consisting of a group of journalists issuing news updates and any leaks via online platforms (e.g., Slack).

DELEGATION ROLES

National delegations

Presidential or Prime Minister staff: Your tasks are to support your Head of State with information, advice, drafting policy, and outreach. You will be responsible for coordination of positions among any domestic agencies related to the issue at hand.

Diplomats: Your key tasks are to seek information about other states' preferences, establish their perceptions about key facts, coordination of national positions (as indicated by your Head of State), facilitate and conduct any bilateral or multilateral meetings. During such meetings your Head of State will need your advice and support.

Military: Your key tasks are to establish, interpret and forward any relevant information about national security and defense issues to your Head of State and, where applicable, to your NATO delegation. You will also need to coordinate with other national agencies, such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Intelligence representatives.

Intelligence: You will seek to obtain information about the actions and preferences of other actors and prevent them from accessing your information. Report to your superiors and Head of State – other actors will have to demonstrate a sufficiently high level of clearance to access information. You may also provide advice to other national agencies (including your embassies and representatives abroad) about protecting classified information. Any counterintelligence operations will have to be approved by the Head of State.

NATO

Deputy Secretary General: Support the Secretary General with advice, participate in bilateral and multilateral meetings.

Remaining members of staff: Support the Secretary General with advice and information from delegations, facilitate coordination of positions among NATO delegations, help to draft proposals, seek information about Russian positions, monitor media, prevent infiltration by foreign agents.

NATO ambassador: The head of the delegation is the national Ambassador (who will be addressed as Ambassador). The tasks of the other members of the delegation are to provide advice and information to the Ambassador, draft statements and position papers, facilitate coordination of positions among NATO delegations, monitor media, and prevent infiltration by foreign agents. These tasks are not defined by the title of each member but will be assigned upon request by the Ambassador.

Press teams

Interfax (Ru), BBC (UK), Le Monde (Fr), Süddeutsche Zeitung (De), NRK (No), Washington Post (US): The correspondents for each national press team will issue press releases, but may also publish leaks from the national delegations (approved by the coordinators or instructors of the simulation). Each press correspondent will have geographical areas of expertise and may seek to nurture strong relations with national delegations to get background information or early warning of national policies or initiatives.

4.0 Simulation Stage 1

4.1 Delegations react to reports of a Norwegian rocket incident

In the first simulation session, each delegation will receive information via the online communication platform (e.g., Slack) about an unfolding incident. They must report the details to their Head of State, collect and coordinate necessary information and decide how to respond to this dangerous and developing situation.

During this stage, the delegation must establish the facts and weigh their options as more information becomes available. They must ensure a coordinated response (i.e., that all representatives and agents of the state or alliance receive information and instructions to enable a coherent policy).

4.2 Goals for Stage 1

Norway, Russia, and the NATO delegations (the United States, the United Kingdom, France and Germany) will each produce a policy memo outlining their reaction to the unfolding incident based on their available information. A policy memo template will be provided to the participants. NATO staff will prepare a draft for a NATO statement. Each Head of State will request information, different options for how to respond, and encourage discussion of potential responses within their delegation. They may also encourage pursuing different bilateral initiatives along the way.

At the end of the first stage, each Head of State will receive a draft policy memo from their delegation, instruct their delegations what changes to make (if any), and ensure that they approve the final policy memo. The final policy memo will be approved by the Head of State before the end of Stage 1.

5.0 Simulation Stage 2

5.1 Delegations seek to address the incident

This session opens with a press conference. Each delegation updates their policy memos – as approved by their Head of State – and policies as more information emerges. The Heads of State should restate their commitment to nuclear risk reduction.

The delegations will prepare statements and positions, with the approval of their Head of State, and set up bi- and multilateral meetings with the other delegations, focusing on defusing the situation. All delegations must ensure the approval of their Head of State before agreeing to official positions and decisions. By the end of Stage 2, delegations should have undergone a round of negotiations and adjusted their policy memos accordingly.

NATO will facilitate contact between delegations as necessary, and will make edits to their statement as additional information and agreements arise.

5.2 Goals for Stage 2

In addition to the negotiations and policy edits, Norway will produce a statement of maximum one paragraph to be circulated among all parties. The content of this Norwegian policy memo will be conveyed at a high-level bilateral meeting between the

Russian and Norwegian delegations. In this meeting, the Heads of State will rely on their delegation members to make statements on behalf of the Russian Federation and the Kingdom of Norway, respectively.

All delegations should seek information about the unfolding events through bi- and multilateral meetings. The Heads of State are free to instruct their delegations to produce and circulate public and press statements based on their policy memo and meetings with other delegations.

Heads of State and the NATO Secretary General will request information and different options for how to respond, and encourage discussion of response options within their delegation. They will also ensure coordination with other delegations throughout the unfolding incident.

Final statements, policy memo edits, and/or negotiated outcomes will be approved by the Head of State at the end of Stage 2, before circulation. Each delegation may respond to these statements, in public or in private, using the online communication platform (e.g., Slack), if they so wish.

6.0 Simulation Stage 3

6.1 Delegations pursue risk reduction measures

The NATO delegations will reconvene in a NATO ministerial meeting (in the main room), led by the NATO Secretary General. The Norwegian delegation will start the meeting by briefing their allies on the incident. Other NATO delegations (the United States, the United Kingdom, France and Germany) will reaffirm their support to Norway as a NATO ally, and support the Norwegian position to handle the incident bilaterally with Russia. The Norwegian delegation will provide an overview of risk reduction measures (e.g., notification procedures) they agree upon during Stage 2 bilateral discussions with Russia. Other delegations may also propose follow-on risk reduction measures.

The Russian delegation will not be present at the NATO ministerial meeting. They will instead interfere with the meeting through the online communication platform (e.g., Slack), by issuing official statements or anonymous tips through the Interfax press team.

6.2 Goals for Stage 3

Norway will defuse the situation through the NATO ministerial meeting, by ensuring their commitment to nuclear risk reduction measures and that they will be able to handle the situation bilaterally with Russia.

Russia will try to establish channels for future technical talks with Norway (and ideally the United States), to avoid similar misunderstandings in the future.

Other delegations will want to consider additional follow-on risk reduction measures to avoid similar incidents.

7.0 Research Resources and Bibliography

For the participants who want to go beyond the assigned reading (i.e., this handbook) and increase their background knowledge of the situation, please see the following literature. This is recommended, but not assigned.

Patricia Lewis, Benoît Pelopidas and Heather Williams, "Too Close for Comfort: Cases of Near Nuclear Use and Options for Policy" (2014), https://www.chathamhouse.org/publications/papers/view/199200

Geoffrey Forden et al., "False alarm, nuclear danger," IEEE Journals & Magazine (2000), https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/825657

Stephen Van Evera, "The Spiral Vs. Deterrence Model," http://web.mit.edu/17.423/www/Archive98/handouts/spiral.html

Eivind V. Thrane, "The History of Andøya Rocket Range," Hist. Geo Space Sci. 9, pp. 141-156 (2018), https://hgss.copernicus.org/articles/9/141/2018/

Nikolai Sokov, "Could Norway Trigger a Nuclear War? Notes on the Russian Command and Control System," PONARS Policy Memo 24, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey institute (1997), https://www.ponarseurasia.org/wp-content/uploads/attachments/pm_0024.pdf

Pavel Podvig, "History and the Current Status of the Russian Early-Warning System," Science and Global Security 10:21, Taylor and Francis. (2002), https://scienceandglobalsecurity.org/archive/sgs10podvig.pdf

Theodore Postol, "How a nuclear near-miss in '95 would be a disaster today," Boston Sunday Globe Opinion (2015), https://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2015/01/25/how-nuclear-near-miss-would-disaster-today/TG4nhiUzPyFtcV0QGybj6J/story.html

Victoria Samson, "Prospects for Russian-American Missile Defence Cooperation: Lessons from RAMOS and JDEC," Contemporary Security Policy 28:3, pp. 494-512. (2007), https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260701737778

U.S Department of State, "National and Nuclear Risk Reduction Center," https://www.state.gov/bureaus-offices/under-secretary-for-arms-control-and-international-security-affairs/bureau-of-arms-control-verification-and-compliance/nuclear-risk-reduction-center/

Federation of American Scientists, "Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers," https://nuke.fas.org/control/nrrc/index.html

United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, "Nuclear Weapon Risk Reduction," https://unidir.org/projects/nuclear-weapon-risk-reduction-1

The Washington Post, "Missile Launching in Norway Triggers Russian Defense Alert," https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1995/01/26/missile-launching-in-norway-triggers-russian-defense-alert/6f7f4bb8-9e9f-4519-975c-719f87183ec3/

Archival sources: (Available upon request)

Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, NOTAM, 21 December 1994

NATO Situation Centre, "Missile fired from and lands in Norway," 25 January 1995

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